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We consider a directed search model for a ﬁnite economy with heterogeneous ﬁrms
in two informational environments. In the ﬁrst, the productivity of all ﬁrms is publicly
observed. We prove existence of equilibria in pure posting strategies by ﬁrms and show
that wage dispersion is driven by fundamentals. That is, more productive ﬁrms post
higher wages and wage dispersion is absent when ﬁrms are homogeneous. When ﬁrms
have heterogeneous productivities the equilibrium is not constrained eﬃcient. In the
second environment the productivity level of each ﬁrm is private information. The
main results extend to this environment: Equilibria in pure strategies exist; strategies
are increasing in productivity; and constrained eﬃciency does not obtain. When the
productivity level of all ﬁrms is drawn from the same distribution, symmetric equilibria
exist and the ranking of wages equals that of productivity.
1 Introduction
There is a large literature modeling trade that occurs in markets with matching frictions.
A strand of this literature which has been very active in recent years is directed search.
The main assumption in this class of models is that one side of the market can publicly
announce (and commit to) the prices at which it is willing to trade. In the context of the
labor market, ﬁrms post wages that are observed by all workers before they decide where
to apply for a job. Hence, a worker knows the wage that he will receive if he gets the
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1job that he applies for, but, since ﬁrms have a limited number of vacancies, he may get
rationed if there are other applicants for the same position. The underlying friction is that
workers cannot coordinate their decisions of which job to apply for, which is modeled as a
restriction to symmetric application strategies. Hence many workers might apply for the same
position even if other vacancies receive no applications at all. Since higher wages attract more
applicants on average, the central trade-oﬀ for a worker is that he faces a lower probability of
getting the job when he applies to a high-wage ﬁrm. Firms face the converse trade-oﬀ at the
wage-posting stage of the game: oﬀering a higher wage increases the probability of hiring,
but it also decreases their ex post proﬁt margin.
This idea has been used to analyze a series of applied topics such as investment decisions
(Acemo˘ glu and Shimer, 1999; Shi, 2001), technological change (Shi, 2002), wage dispersion
among homogeneous labor (Montgommery, 1991) and labor allocations with two-sided het-
erogeneity (Shimer, 2005). Two main conclusions arise from this line of research: (1) ﬁrms
with higher productivity - either due to idiosyncratic ability or due to higher capital invest-
ments - post higher wages, and (2) the allocation is constrained eﬃcient.1 These results are
interesting because they provide an interpretation for the well-known fact that observation-
ally identical workers receive higher wages when employed at more proﬁtable (in this context
more productive) ﬁrms.2 Furthermore, market frictions mean that dispersion in wages plays
an important allocative role as it directs labor towards more productive ﬁrms.
These results were obtained for models with a continuum of agents (except for the case of
Montgomery (1991) which we discuss below). In this paper, we examine the ﬁnite economy
version which has received much less attention. The main diﬀerence between the continuum
and ﬁnite versions is that in the latter the action of an individual ﬁrm typically aﬀects the
payoﬀs of all other market participants, including other ﬁrms. We think that the ﬁnite
economy is of economic interest because interactions in the labor market at a given point in
time, at a given geographical location and for a given profession are likely to only involve
a limited number of agents despite the large size of the overall economy. As a result, when
these agents act, they may actually take their interdependence into account.
Furthermore, it allows us to assess the extent to which the insights of the continuum
economy apply to the ﬁnite case. Existing results for ﬁnite economies rely on mixed strategies
by ﬁrms when ﬁrms have heterogeneous productivity (Peters 1994, 2000). The randomization
of ﬁrms may result in outcomes where a low productivity ﬁrm posts a higher wage than
a ﬁrm with high productivity, which runs counter to the characterization results for the
1The models of Moen (1997) are Mortensen and Wright (2002) are similar in spirit and results.
2Determinants of wage dispersion for homogeneous workers have attracted some interest in the literature.
See Mortensen (2003) for a discussion.
2continuum case.3 As a result, we may not be able to interpret wage diﬀerences as indicators of
productivity diﬀerences. Moreover, in such an equilibrium eﬃciency can be trivially improved
by requiring high-productivity ﬁrms to post higher wages and hence hire more often. To
evaluate whether this is a fundamental problem of ﬁnite economies or not, we investigate
whether equilibria in pure strategies by the ﬁrms exist. Additionally, pure posting strategies
seem to be a simpler and more plausible way to recruit. For homogeneous ﬁrms, we know
from Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001, henceforth BSW) that there exists an equilibrium in
pure posting strategies in which all workers oﬀer the same wage.4 We are interested in
whether this implies that wages are determined by fundamentals, or whether there are also
other equilibria in which identical ﬁrms post diﬀerent wages.
We analyze a setting with heterogeneous ﬁrms and homogeneous workers. Heteroge-
neous ﬁrms allow us to analyze the aspect of productivity on wage announcements. As in
Montgomery (1991) and Moen (1997), we reduce the mathematical complexity by assuming
homogeneous workers.5 We consider two informational environments. In the ﬁrst, the pro-
ductivity of all ﬁrms is publicly observed (in particular, by other ﬁrms) as in Peters (1984,
2000) and Montgomery (1991). This may be due to observable investments or due to knowl-
edge obtained during previous coexistence. We establish the existence of an equilibrium in
pure strategies for the ﬁrms and we characterize it.6 We prove that higher productivity
ﬁrms post higher wages and, as a corollary, there is no wage dispersion when there are no
productivity diﬀerences across ﬁrms. Hence, in the case of homogeneous ﬁrms, the single
wage equilibrium is unique in pure posting strategies and, in the case of heterogeneous ﬁrms,
the dispersion in wages is due to productivity diﬀerentials. We think that our results are
interesting because they imply that, even in a ﬁnite frictional setting, wage dispersion is
driven by fundamentals. This implies that labor is allocated to a larger degree to ﬁrms with
high productivity. Nevertheless, the market does not achieve constrained eﬃciency, because
market power distorts the diﬀerence between wages and thus the application behavior. The
exception is the case of homogeneous ﬁrms, where dispersion in wages is not present and
constrained eﬃciency is obtained.
In the second environment, the productivity of each ﬁrm is a privately observed draw
from some known distribution, which is a setting that has not yet been analyzed in the liter-
ature. It may arise when a ﬁrm faces new competitors or when investments in productivity
3Peters (2000) shows that these equilibria approach the continuum outcomes when the economy is repli-
cated and approaches an inﬁnite number of agents. However, in this paper we are interested in outcomes
away from that limit.
4Existence in pure posting strategies has also been proven in Peters (1994) for homogeneous ﬁrms.
5Homogeneous labor has been used a lot in the search literature, see Mortensen (2003).
6The frictions are introduced by symmetric strategies by workers, which requires mixed strategies on their
part. Therefore, our analysis of pure strategies refers only to ﬁrms.
3are imperfectly observable. In a continuum economy, this environment is identical to the
previous one since the (convention about the) law of large numbers implies that there is no
uncertainty about the types of ﬁrms in the market. However, in a ﬁnite model the uncer-
tainty about the realizations of ﬁrms’ productivity is present. Using recent results on games
with incomplete information, we establish the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies
by ﬁrms. Furthermore, we show that a ﬁrm’s wage oﬀer increases in its type. In contrast
to the complete information case and to the continuum models, comparisons of wages across
ﬁrms do not necessarily reveal their ranking in terms of productivity if ﬁrms draw their pro-
ductivity levels from diﬀerent distributions. Only when the distributions are symmetric can
we be certain that a symmetric equilibrium exists, in which case higher wages are indeed
posted by higher productivity ﬁrms. The ineﬃciencies observed in the complete information
case carry over to this case of incomplete information.
Finite economies entail an eﬀect that we call global market power. It entails that a wage
change by a single ﬁrm changes the cumulative distribution function of wages in the market.
Therefore, ﬁrms cannot “mimick” the wage postings of other ﬁrms and obtain the same
hiring probability, but rather face very diﬀerent application behavior. It will be instructive
to examine this in more detail in the next subsection, and distinguish it from the notion
of limited market power that is present even in continuum economies. To do this we will
brieﬂy have to review the explicit nature of the frictions that directed search models impose
on the workers application behavior. The subsequent sections lay down the formal model
and analyze the case of complete and incomplete information.
2 Eﬀects of Global Market Power in Finite Economies
Directed search models are based on the assumption that ﬁrms can compete for labor. Never-
theless, there remains a search component since workers do not know how many other workers
apply for a job. The presumption is that workers cannot coordinate. This is captured by a
restriction to symmetric strategies, in which all workers apply to a given ﬁrm with the same
probability. This can be viewed as representing the anonymity in the market: players do not
need to know their “role” in the game in equilibria in which they all use the same strategy.
The plausibility of this assumption is discussed e.g. in Shimer (2005).
If all workers apply to ﬁrm j with the same application probability pj, then a worker
who applies there has some probability, say G(pj), of getting the job. We will lay out the
formulas in the next section. In the subgame after observing a wage announcement, worker
apply in such a way that they are indiﬀerent between all ﬁrms. That is, they apply such
that the expected utility G(pj)wj is equalized at all ﬁrms (except for those ﬁrms that might
4not receive any applications at all). If a ﬁrm raises its wage, the probability with which
workers apply increases smoothly in the ﬁrm’s wage. A symmetric equilibrium necessitates
mixed application behavior, therefore our statements about pure posting strategies refer to
the behavior of the ﬁrms. The idea of a subgame in symmetric strategies also translates -
with some technical diﬃculties - to economies with a continuum of agents.7
We mentioned in the introduction that global market power is a speciﬁc feature of ﬁnite
economies. A single ﬁrm that changes its wage aﬀects the cumulative distribution of wages
that are obtainable in the market, and thus it changes the expected utility of workers and the
expected hiring probability of all other ﬁrms. In continuum economies such an eﬀect is not
present. Firms still have limited market power in the sense that their hiring probability is
increasing in their wage announcement. But in a continuum economy, each worker changes his
application probability to this ﬁrm very little (because otherwise too many workers would
apply for the single job), and the workers’ expected utilities are not aﬀected. The small
changes by many workers sum up to a signiﬁcant eﬀect for the deviating ﬁrm, but since
workers do not change their application behavior much, the other ﬁrms’ proﬁts are also not
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Figure 1: Illustration of global market power.
7The technical diﬃculty arises from the fact that one cannot assign a probability of applying to a ﬁrm,
since there are too many ﬁrms in the market.
5The ﬁgure shows a candidate equilibrium constellation in which ﬁve ﬁrms oﬀer ﬁve dif-
ferent wages. If workers use symmetric strategies in the subgame, this yields them some
expected utility, say U(w), in the subgame. The expected utility depends on the tuple
w = (w1,...,w5) of announced wages. Since workers are indiﬀerent between the ﬁrms when
they randomize, we have G(pj)wj = U(w) at all ﬁrms. The application behavior of the
workers induces some expected hiring probability for each ﬁrm. This is depicted by the dots
in the lower part of the picture. Since the expected proﬁt of a ﬁrm is
Expected Profit = [ Expected Hiring Probability ] [ Productivity − Wage ] (1)
this induces some expected proﬁt for each ﬁrm, as depicted in the upper part of the ﬁgure.
If a ﬁrm would assume that its own action does not aﬀect the workers utility in the
subgame, i.e. ﬁrm j believes that U(w) = U = constant independent of ﬁrm j’s wage
posting wj, then it would expect to obtain an application behavior of
G(pj)wj = U = constant, (2)
at each deviation wage wj. This is the case because workers apply with a probability that
makes them just indiﬀerent to the utility they can obtain at other ﬁrms. Such a belief induces
the solid line that connects the dots. In particular, under this belief, ﬁrm 1 thinks that it
can obtain the same hiring probability as ﬁrm 2 if it deviates and oﬀers the same wage as
ﬁrm 2. Equation (2) is justiﬁed in a continuum economy. Montgomery (1991) assumes such
beliefs in a ﬁnite economy.8 Under such beliefs it relatively straightforward to show that
identical ﬁrms oﬀer the same wage. They all face the same proﬁt function (the higher solid
line), and since this function has a unique optimum all ﬁrms want to deviate and post this
optimal wage. Thus, any equilibrium has to involve all ﬁrms posting the same wage. If ﬁrms
are heterogeneous, each ﬁrm will have their own proﬁt function, with the maximum of higher
productivity ﬁrms being on the right of those ﬁrms with lower productivity.
Yet in a ﬁnite economy the belief given by (2) is not justiﬁed. If ﬁrm 1 deviates from the
candidate proﬁle and oﬀers the same wage as ﬁrm 2, it will get a lower hiring probability
than ﬁrm 2 obtained in the candidate proﬁle. The reason is simple: Firm 2 faces three high
wage competitors and one low wage competitor in the candidate wage announcement. When
ﬁrm 1 “mimicks” ﬁrm 2, after the deviation ﬁrm 1 will face four high wage competitors.
This means that after the deviation ﬁrm 1 has tougher competition than ﬁrm 2 had before
the deviation. Another way of making the same point is to observe that after the deviation
8For the case of two workers and two ﬁrms Montgomery (1991) also investigates the case of global market
power.
6ﬁrm 2 has fewer lower hiring probability than before the deviation, because now ﬁrm 1 has
become more attractive to workers, i.e. U(w) has increased. After the deviation ﬁrm 1 and
2 will both have equal hiring probability, but it will be lower than the hiring probability of
ﬁrm 2 before the deviation. Therefore, ﬁrm 1’s hiring probability will always lie below the
solid line, as depicted by the lower dotted line. Similarly, ﬁrm 5’s hiring probability is always
above the solid line. Before a deviation the other ﬁrms faced a high wage competitor. When
ﬁrm 5 deviates and oﬀers, say, w4, there is no other high wage competitor present. This is
the same as saying that the workers expected utility U(w) has gone down, and since this
indicates that their options have become worse they apply more to wage w4 (and to all other
wages as well). This is represented by the higher of the dotted lines.
The proﬁtability of a deviation now depends on the slope of the hiring probability for
the deviant. In the picture, the slope for ﬁrm 1 is less than for ﬁrm 5. Therefore, it is
less proﬁtable to raise the wage for ﬁrm 1 than for ﬁrm 5. This might lead to proﬁts as
depicted by the dotted lines at the top of ﬁgure 1. Firm 1’s optimal deviation wage is
lower than ﬁrm 5’s optimal deviation wage. The question is whether this can sustain wage
dispersion for homogeneous ﬁrms. Even if ﬁrms are heterogeneous, it is not obvious that
ﬁrm 1 would want to deviate even if it has a higher productivity than ﬁrm 5, since its beneﬁt
from deviating is diﬀerent than the beneﬁt for ﬁrm 5. The question arises whether high
productivity ﬁrms might be locked into lower wage postings. Finally, the global market
power eﬀect also complicates the prove of existence substantially, because it is less obvious
whether proﬁts are quasi-concave and therefore best responses are convex-valued.
In order to analyze the ﬁnite market environment, it will be necessary to analyze the
slope of the hiring probability. This requires us to investigate the reaction of workers to a
wage change by a ﬁrm for any proﬁle of wages by other ﬁrms. That is, we need to investigate
∂pj/∂wj. One contribution of our work is to provide an explicit solution to these partial
derivatives. We expect this to be useful for further work on ﬁnite directed search models,
because it allows us to proceed analytically. We can sign the second derivative ∂2pj/∂w2
j
when ﬁrm j has positive hiring probability, which allows us to establish quasi-concavity of
the proﬁt function and thus existence in pure posting strategies. We can also investigate the
ﬁrst order conditions and show that the diﬀerence between the wage postings is always larger
than the diﬀerence between the best responses for homogeneous ﬁrms. It is even smaller when
high productivity ﬁrms oﬀer the lower wage. Therefore, lower productivity ﬁrms cannot oﬀer
the higher wage in equilibrium in pure posting strategies.
Figure (1) also illustrates the reason why eﬃciency fails except for the special case of
homogeneous ﬁrms. Montgomery (1991) shows that constrained eﬃciency is obtained when
ﬁrms hold belief (2), i.e. expect the solid line after a deviation. In a ﬁnite economy in which
7ﬁrms realize their global market power, they expect a diﬀerent response after a deviation,
as depicted by the dotted lines. These responses are smaller slope than the solid line, and
therefore ﬁrms tend to post lower wage since a wage increase yields less of an advantage for
their hiring prospects. Wages per se are not important in a transferable utility environment,
the question is whether vacancies are ﬁlled optimally (given the constraint that workers
use symmetric strategies). With homogeneous ﬁrms, all ﬁrms post the same wage, and are
eﬀected by the eﬀects of market power in the same way. That is, they reduce their wages by
the same amount compared to the case where they neglect their global market power, and
thus the eﬀect does not translate into diﬀerences in the workers’ application behavior, i.e.
workers still apply equally often to all ﬁrms and the outcome remains constrained eﬃcient.
In the case of heterogeneous ﬁrms, ﬁrms oﬀer diﬀerent wages and are eﬀected diﬀerently by
the eﬀect of global market power. This distorts their wages diﬀerently compared to the case
where they neglect this eﬀect, workers apply in a diﬀerent way. We prove for the duopoly
case that constrained eﬃciency is never achieved when ﬁrms are heterogeneous.
3 The Model
There is a ﬁnite set M = {1,...,m} of ﬁrms and a ﬁnite set N = {1,...,n} of workers,
where m ≥ 2 and n ≥ 2. Workers are homogenous. Each ﬁrm j ∈ M has productivity
xj drawn from a distribution with continuous non-zero density on its support [xj, ¯ xj]. We
assume xj > 0 for all j ∈ M. Each ﬁrm knows its own productivity. We will analyze two
informational environments. We will ﬁrst consider the complete information case where each
ﬁrm knows the realized productivities of all the other ﬁrms. This case has been the focus
in the literature, see e.g. Peters (1984, 2000) and BSW. We will also analyze the private
information case where ﬁrms know their own productivity but only know the distribution
over other ﬁrms’ productivities.
In the ﬁrst stage of the game, each ﬁrm j ∈ M simultaneously posts a public wage
oﬀer wj ∈ [0,xj]. In the next stage, workers observe the tuple of announced wages w =
(w1,w2,...,wm) and decide simultaneously on the ﬁrm to which they want to apply.9 If
a ﬁrm has multiple applicants, it chooses one of them randomly and employs him at the
announced wage. Firm j receives proﬁt xj − wj if it hires a worker and zero otherwise.
Worker i get’s utility wj if he gets hired by ﬁrm j, and zero if he does not get hired. Firms
maximize expected proﬁts; workers maximize expected utilities.
9The assumption that each applicant auditions for a job only at a single ﬁrm is standard in the literature.
Multiple applications have recently been analyzed in continuum models by Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman
(2006), Galenianos and Kircher (2006) and Kircher (2006). In ﬁnite models this leads to severe complications
as shown in Albrecht, Gautier, Tan and Vroman (2005).
8We will retain the standard assumption of symmetric application behavior in the subgame
following the wage postings. This typically requires a mixed strategy on the part of the
workers. Let pj,i(w) denote the probability with which worker i applies to ﬁrm j after
observing w. Symmetric strategies by workers imply that pj,i(w) = pj,h(w) = pj(w) for all
h,i ∈ N and all j ∈ M. When all workers apply to ﬁrm j with probability pj, the probability
that the ﬁrm has at least one applicant (and is thus able to hire) is given by
H(pj) = 1 − (1 − pj)
n. (3)
With probability (1 − pj)n no worker applies, and with the complementary probability at
least one worker applies. The probability of an individual worker getting the job at this ﬁrm
conditional on applying there is
G(pj) = [1 − (1 − pj)
n]/npj (4)
if pj > 0, and G(0) = 1 (see BSW). Since [1 − (1 − pj)n] is the probability that ﬁrm j
hires a worker and there are in expectation npj workers applying for the job, intuitively an
applicant’s hiring probability is given by the ration of the two as stated in expression (4).
If workers apply more often to ﬁrm j, ﬁrm j’s hiring probability increases. That is,
h(pj) = H0(pj) = n(1 − pj)n−1 is strictly positive for pj < 1. If other applicants apply more
often to ﬁrm j, the probability for an individual worker to obtain a job at ﬁrm j decreases
conditional on applying, i.e., g(pj) = G0(pj) = −[G(pj) − (1 − pj)n−1]/pj < 0 for pj > 0 and
g(0) = −(n − 1)/2. Given a vector of posted wages w and a symmetric strategy proﬁle by




Deﬁnition 3.1 (Symmetric Application Response) A symmetric application response
to w, i.e. a symmetric equilibrium in the subgame following wage announcements w, is a
vector p(w) in the m − 1 dimensional unit simplex such that for all j ∈ M
G(pj(w))wj = U(w) if pj > 0. (6)
In the following we will assume that p(w) arises from a symmetric application response
to the wage oﬀers w. From Proposition 1 in Peters (1984) we know that this response is
unique when wk > 0 for some k, and it varies upper hemicontinuously in w. The reason for
uniqueness can be seen from the fact that by (6) a ﬁxed U uniquely deﬁnes pj for all j given
9the announced wage wj. Increasing U increases pj for all j and strictly increases pj for some
j, so that there is exactly one U such that
P
pj = 1.
Firms anticipate the response to their wage announcements, and a vector of wage oﬀers
w induces expected proﬁts
πj(w) = H(pj(w))(xj − wj) (7)
for ﬁrm j with productivity xj.10
In a directed search environment it is obvious that a ﬁrm that oﬀers a wage that is much
lower than its competitors will not receive any applications. Firms that never receive any
applicants might oﬀer arbitrary wage proﬁles, which are diﬃcult to handle in the analysis.
Therefore, before moving to the main analysis, we will brieﬂy provide a condition under
which ﬁrms have positive hiring probabilities at least when they oﬀer wages close to their
productivity.
Given a wage proﬁle w−j of other ﬁrms, ﬁrm j has to oﬀer at least wage wj in order to
attract applicants. This minimal wage depends on the utility that workers obtain if they do
not apply to ﬁrm j. We will deﬁne this utility as
U−j(w−j) = U(0,w−j). (8)
If ﬁrm j oﬀers a zero wage, workers will not apply to it but rather apply optimally to the other
ﬁrms, yielding them a utility U(0,w−j) in the subgame after observing the zero wage oﬀer
by ﬁrm j. If wj ≤ wj = U−j(w−j), ﬁrm j will not obtain any applicants, while workers will
apply at any wage wj > wj. For later conditions it will be useful to note that wj < U−j(w−j)
is equivalent to wj < U(wj,w−j). If wj is so low that no worker applies, the market utility
is not aﬀected by adding this wage to the set of available wages. Also, wj = U−j(w−j)
is equivalent to wj = U(wj,w−j). Adding wage wj to the set of available wages does not
alter the utility obtainable for workers, because wj is only as good as the utility available
at other ﬁrms if almost surely nobody applies, i.e. pj = 0. If workers do not apply there
in the subgame, it does not change their available utility. This immediately implies that
wj > U−j(w−j) is equivalent to wj > U(wj,w−j). If wj is such that workers apply with
strictly positive probability, then by (6) the wage is higher than the utility obtainable in the
market.
10Note that the requirement of a symmetric application response does not deﬁne p(w) uniquely at w = 0.
To ﬁx ideas it is convenient to assume p(0) = 1/m, yet our results hold for any speciﬁcation of p(0) in the
m − 1 dimensional unit simplex.
10The following condition ensures that in a symmetric application response workers apply
to ﬁrm j with strictly positive probability if it oﬀers a wage close to its productivity. It
is immediate to see that this condition is non-empty and always holds if the span of the
support, that is ¯ xj − xj, is not too large.
C1 For all j ∈ M: xj > U−j(¯ x−j), where ¯ x−j = (¯ x1,.., ¯ xj−1, ¯ xj+1,..¯ xN).
Imposing this condition will sometimes be convenient as it ensures that all ﬁrms in the mar-
ket have the ability to attract applicants with strictly positive probability, and thus have the
ability to make strictly positive proﬁts. Otherwise their choice of wage oﬀer will be arbitrary
and it is diﬃcult to talk about wage oﬀers increasing in productivity. Moreover, even if a ﬁrm
cannot proﬁtably attract applicants is can inﬂuence other ﬁrms’ optimal choices by oﬀering
a wage that would attract applicants if another ﬁrm would lower its wage. We will explicitly
indicate statements where the condition is relevant.
4 The Complete Information Environment
4.1 Heterogeneous Firms
Consider the case where the realization x = (x1,...,xm) of productivities is known to all
ﬁrms.11 We deﬁne a directed search equilibrium as a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in the
game among ﬁrms with induced payoﬀs πj(w) given in (7). Letting W = ×m
j=1[0,xj] denote
the ﬁrms’ strategy space and the vector (w0
j,w−j) = (w1,...,wj−1,w0
j,wj+1,...,wm) account
for individual deviations, we formally have
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Directed Search Equilibrium) A directed search equilibrium is a vector
of wage announcements w ∈ W such that πj(w) ≥ πj(w0
j,w−j) for all j ∈ M and all
w0
j ∈ [0,xj].
Note that our deﬁnition involves pure strategies by ﬁrms. The existence of such pure
strategy equilibria has only been shown for homogeneous productivities (BSW; Peters, 1984).
Existence and characterization for the general setup depend on the reaction of the workers’
11Following the literature, we take the trading mechanism and its coordination failure as given. For xj 6= xk
for all j,k ∈ M the coordination problem could be solved if workers oﬀered contracts, see Coles and Eeckhout
(2003). There are various reasons why this might not arise, among them the fact that in an Coles-Eeckhout
worker-oﬀer-market ﬁrms do not obtain any surplus and would rather enter a ﬁrm-oﬀer-market (for a model
of competing market sides see Halko, Kultti and Virrankoski (2006)). In general one might think about some
ﬁrms having equal productivity, so that the coordination problem is not resolved by switching market sides.
11application probability pj to the wage change of ﬁrm j. In the next lemma we will analyze
this reaction. We will specify this reaction for wage proﬁles w ∈ Ωj = {w ∈ W|wj >
U(w),wk 6= U(w) ∀k ∈ M}. Recall from the discussion of equation (8) that wk 6= U(w)
is equivalent to wk 6= U−k(w−k). The set Ωj, therefore, excludes those wage proﬁles with
the property that some ﬁrm k does not receive applications at wage wj or higher, but would
receive applications if ﬁrm j lowered its wage. At the excluded wage proﬁles ﬁrst order
conditions cannot be applied. For these cases we can deﬁne left and right derivatives by
taking the appropriate limits, though. We also exclude the uninteresting cases of wj < U(w)
for which ﬁrm j does not get any applicants. Let M(w) = {k ∈ M|wk > U(w)} denote the
set all of ﬁrms that receive applicants, where we drop the argument w in some equations
for brevity. Moreover, let uj(w) = g(pj(w))wj denote the marginal beneﬁt of workers from
changing the probability of applying to ﬁrm j. We will show that the change in application
behavior in response to a wage change by a ﬁrm depends in a simple way on the probability
of obtaining a job at this ﬁrm and on a score that reﬂects the marginal beneﬁts of applying
to the various ﬁrms:12





















Proof. Without loss of generality let M(w) = {1,...,h} include the ﬁrst h ﬁrms. Since
w ∈ Ωj no ﬁrm is on the boundary of getting applicants, i.e. wj 6= U(w) for all ﬁrms.
Therefore those ﬁrms not in M(w) have wj < U(w) and do not get any applicants for wage
announcements in the neighborhood of w, and therefore do not enter the analysis. By (6)
we have
G(pk(w))wk − G(ph(w))wh = 0 ∀k ∈ {1,...,h − 1} (10)
and
P
k∈M pk(w)−1 = 0. Writing the left hand side of these as a system F(p;w) of h equa-
tions with h exogenous parameters w1,...,wh and h endogenous variables p1,...,ph we have
an implicit function F(p;w) = 0. For this system of equations the Jacobian of endogenous
12For the relevant matrix algebra see e.g. Korn and Korn (1968).




    
   

u1(w) 0 0 ... 0 0 −uh(w)
0 u2(w) 0 ... 0 0 −uh(w)
0 0 u3(w) ... 0 0 −uh(w)
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
0 0 0 ... uh−2(w) 0 −uh(w)
0 0 0 ... 0 uh−1(w) −uh(w)
1 1 1 ... 1 1 1


     
   

.
That is, DpF is the matrix with elements αss = us(w) and αsh = −uh(w) for s ∈ {1,...,h−1},
αhs = 1 for s ∈ {1,...,h} and αsk = 0 otherwise. To calculate the determinant |DpF| we
use Laplace’s development to expand the last row and obtain |DpF| =
Ph
s=1 Λhs, where
Λhs is the cofactor to element αhs. That is, Λhs = (−1)h+s|Ahs|, where Ahs is the matrix
resulting from DpF by elimination of the h0th row and the s0th column. Since Ahh is a
diagonal matrix we have |Ahh| =
Q
k∈M\{h} uk(w). For s < h we expand the s0th row of
|Ahs| which yields |Ahs| = (−1)h−1+s(−uh(w))|Bhs|, where Bhs is a (h − 2)2-dimensional
diagonal matrix with diagonal elements uk(w) for all k ∈ M\{s,h}. We therefore have
|Ahs| = (−1)h+s Q




k∈M\{s} uk(w). By the deﬁni-
tion of M we have |DpF| 6= 0. By application of the implicit function theorem ∂pj(w)/∂wj
exists locally around w, with Dwp = −(DpF)−1DwF deﬁning the matrix of partial deriva-
tives. As an implication of Cramer’s Rule (DpF)−1 = |DpF|−1C, where C is the matrix
with elements γls = Λsl. The Jacobian with respect to the exogenous variables DwF eval-
uated at (p(w),w) is simply a diagonal matrix except for the last column, with elements
βss = G(ps(w)) and βsh = −G(ph(w)) for s ∈ {1,..,h−1} and zeros elsewhere. We therefore
have ∂pj(w)/∂wj = −Λjj|DpF|−1G(pj(w)). This follows immediately for j ∈ {1,..,h − 1},
and holds for j = h by symmetry which is cumbersome but straightforward to verify analyt-
ically. Since the cofactor Λjj has a similar structure as the determinant |DpF| only with row




k∈M\{j,s} uk(w), and we obtain the ﬁrst
equality in (9). The second equality follows by simple algebraic manipulations.
For the following existence proof we need further properties of the change in the applica-
tion probability. Recall that we deﬁned that lowest wage at which a ﬁrm can attract appli-
cants as wj = U−j(w−j). Since pj(wj,w−j) = 0 for wj ≤ wj, we can show that pj(wj,w−j)
is quasi-concave in wj by showing
Lemma 4.2 Given w−j with wk > 0 for some k ∈ M\{j}, pj(wj,w−j) is strictly concave
13in wj for wj ∈ [wj,xj].
Proof. See Appendix.
This result will allow us to establish quasi-concavity of the proﬁt function for ﬁrms, which
will be important to establish existence.13 To apply ﬁxed point theorems, we have to deal
with point of proﬁt discontinuity at w = 0. The discontinuity arises because at w = 0
workers do not get any utility and ﬁrms have a probability of hiring less than unity. An
individual deviation to any positive wage implies that all workers apply to the deviant for
sure, which allows the deviant to hire with certainty and thus yields a jump in proﬁts. To
ensure continuity of the payoﬀ function, we will bound the strategy space away from zero
to some space W = ×m
j=1[,xj] for  > 0. Lemma 4.3 shows that any equilibrium in the
restricted strategy space W is also an equilibrium in the unrestricted strategy space W,
because no ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate.
Lemma 4.3 There exists 0 > 0 such that for any  ≤ 0 the following holds: For any wage
proﬁle w ∈ W ﬁrm j’s best response in the unrestricted space [0, ¯ xj] includes an element in
[,xj].
Proof. By (6) we can ﬁnd a number t > 1 independent of  such that workers will choose
pj = 0 whenever wj ≤  and wk ≥ t for some k ∈ M/{j}. Therefore, whenever some ﬁrm
chooses a wage higher than t ﬁrm j’s proﬁts are zero on [0,], and therefore any wage in
[,xj] is at least as good for ﬁrm j. On the other hand, assume w−j ∈ [,t]n−1. In this case
there exists a number z independent of  such that wj ≥ z implies pk = 0 for all k 6= j
and pj = 1. At wj =  it holds that pj < 1/m. Therefore π(,w−j) < π(z,w−j) when  is
suﬃciently small. Due to strict quasi-concavity of the proﬁt function no choice below  can
then yield a higher payoﬀ.
The reason why the strategy space can be bounded away from zero – the point of proﬁt
discontinuity – is an immediate consequence of the competition in directed search. If some
other ﬁrm oﬀers a high wage, then a ﬁrm that oﬀers a low wage in [0,] will not get any
applicants because its wage oﬀer is unattractive and so it might as well oﬀer  rather than
any lower wage. On the other hand, if all other ﬁrms oﬀer low wages, then oﬀering a low wage
13The range of low wages that yields zero proﬁts leads to quasi-concavity instead of the strict concavity
that obtains at wages at which the ﬁrm makes strictly positive proﬁts (given the other ﬁrms’ wage oﬀers).
Since quasi-concavity is not preserved in expectation against other random strategies, we were not able to
prove that only pure strategy equilibria exist, i.e. that mixed strategy equilibria would have to be degenerate.
Proving a super-modular nature of the interaction by uniformly signing the cross-partials has yet been elusive.
14in [0,] yields at best an average application probability. Outbidding the other ﬁrms with a
wage to which all applicants apply for sure is proﬁtable, because it is cheap in absolute terms
since the others are oﬀering nearly no utility to the workers and it allows the ﬁrm to hire
for sure. There are other methods to the discontinuity problem like Reny’s (1999) concept
of better reply security, which is fulﬁlled in this environment. The approach taken here will
be useful because a similar version applies in the incomplete information environment.
The previous lemmas enable us to show the existence of a directed search equilibrium.
Recall that the equilibrium deﬁnition entails the focus on pure strategies, which is the main
cause of technical diﬃculty and the main contribution over previous existence results.
Proposition 4.1 A directed search equilibrium exists.
Proof. We will restrict the strategy space to W for  small. We will ﬁrst establish quasi-
concavity of a ﬁrm j’s proﬁt function given some vector w−j of other ﬁrms wage announce-
ments with wk ≥  for all k 6= j. For wj < wj ﬁrm j’s proﬁt is trivially zero. For wj ∈ [wj,xj]
we will establish strict concavity in wj. We will ﬁrst show strict concavity locally at all
(wj,w−j) ∈ Ωj. The ﬁrst derivative of the proﬁt function (7) is given by
∂πj(w)
∂wj




















(xj − wj), (12)
where we suppressed the argument w for brevity. It is easy to see that h0(pi) = −n (n −
1) (1 − pi)n−2 < 0. Since h(pi) > 0, ∂pi/∂wi > 0, and ∂2pi/∂w2
i < 0 by lemma 4.2, we have
strict concavity locally. The set (wj,w−j) / ∈ Ωj has only a ﬁnite number of elements and
we can take left and right derivatives by taking the appropriate limits of (11). As shown in
the proof of lemma 4.2 the slope of the workers response ∂pj(w)/∂wj is larger for the left
than the right limit, therefore the left derivative of the proﬁt function is larger than the right
derivative and strict concavity extends globally.
W is closed and convex. On W the vector p(w) is continuous, therefore the proﬁt
functions are continuous, and therefore the best response correspondence of the ﬁrms are
upper-hemicontinuous by Berge’s Theorem. Since proﬁts are quasi-concave the correspon-
dence is convex-valued. This ensures existence by Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem.
15Next, we turn to our main characterization result that higher productivity ﬁrms pay higher
wages. The result would follow immediately from (11) if the ﬁrms would face the same set
of competing wages w−j, as then higher productivity ﬁrms have a higher ﬁrst derivative.
Since the set of competing wages is in general diﬀerent for each ﬁrm (as each ﬁrm does not
compete with itself), the proof is more involved. Nevertheless, the insight is similar: A high
productivity ﬁrm that oﬀers a low wage in a candidate equilibrium has a higher incentive
to locally raise its wage compared to a lower productivity ﬁrm that considers a deviation
around its candidate high wage.
A higher incentive to raise the wage will contradict the case where high productivity
ﬁrms oﬀer low wages, if higher incentives imply proﬁtability of a deviation. This will be
the case if optimality is characterized by a ﬁrst order condition, but might not hold if the
proﬁt function is “kinked”. Kinks can arise if some ﬁrm posts such a wage that it does not
attract applicants, but would attract applicants if some other ﬁrm would reduce its wage.
On the other hand, optimality is characterized by a ﬁrst order condition if the equilibrium
wage proﬁle is in Ωj for all j. We ensure this by focusing on an environment in which all
ﬁrms make strictly positive proﬁts. This will be the case when ﬁrms’ productivities are not
too diﬀerent as ensured by condition (C1).14 It will also apply if the number of workers is
suﬃciently large given the number of ﬁrms. Alternatively it holds under a standard free entry
condition for the ﬁrms in M, i.e., if each ﬁrm j with productivity xj ﬁrst decides whether to
actually enter the market at cost K and then the entrants compete as outlined here.
Proposition 4.2 Under (C1), any directed search equilibrium w ∈ W involves wj > wk if
xj > xk and wj = wk if xj = xk for j,k ∈ M.
Proof. Assume x1 > x2 but w1 ≤ w2. The focus on ﬁrms 1 and 2 is without loss of generality.
By (C1) all ﬁrms make strictly positive proﬁts in equilibrium. By standard arguments there
is no equilibrium in which all ﬁrms set a wage of zero, as their hiring probability would be
less than one and any slight increase in the wage would allow a ﬁrm to hire for sure. If some
ﬁrms set strictly positive wages, then a ﬁrm that wants to hire has to oﬀer a strictly positive
wage. Since all ﬁrms make strictly positive proﬁts, equilibrium wages are characterized by






(xl − wl) = 0 for l ∈ {1,2}. (13)
14It can be shown that the result holds for those ﬁrms making strictly positive proﬁts in any equilibrium
w in which xj 6= U(w) for all j ∈ M. Only if ﬁrms oﬀer a wage equal to their productivity, nevertheless do
not get any applicants, but would get applicants with strictly positive probability if other ﬁrms lowered their
wage, is the ﬁrst order approach taken here not valid.
16The ﬁrst equality in (9) implies that ∂p1(w)/∂w1 ≥ ∂p2(w)/∂w2 if and only if |g(p2(w))|w2 ≥
|g(p1(w))|w1. Since this cannot be assured for arbitrary candidate equilibria w, we will pro-
ceed to show [h(pj(w))/H(pj(w))][∂pj(w)/∂wj] is weakly higher for ﬁrm 1 than for ﬁrm 2.
Since x1 > x2 but w1 ≤ w2 optimality for ﬁrm 2 implies that ﬁrm 1 strictly prefers to raise
its wage, providing the desired contradiction.








is higher for j = 1 than for j = 2. Since p1(w) ≤ p2(w), we have h(p1(w) ≥ h(p2(w)),
H(p1(w)) ≤ H(p2(w)) and G(p1(w)) ≥ G(p2(w)). The sum in (14) contains the term
Q
k/ ∈{1,2} |g(pk(w))|wk that is common to both ﬁrm 1 and 2, but is multiplied by a higher fac-
tor for ﬁrm 1. The other terms of the sum are common except for the fact that |g(p1(w))|w1








By (6) it holds that w2/w1 = G(p1(w))/G(p2(w)). Together with |g(pj)| = [G(pj) − (1 −
pj)n−1]/pj and G(pj) = H(pj)/(npj) inequality (15) reduces to
G(p2(w)) − (1 − p2(w))n−1
G(p2(w))(1 − p2(w))n−1 ≥
G(p1(w)) − (1 − p1(w))n−1
G(p1(w))(1 − p2(w))n−1 .
For this, it will be suﬃcient to show that [G(p) − (1 − p)n−1]/[G(p)(1 − p)n−1] is strictly
increasing in p. The derivative of this expression has the same sign as
n − 1
1 − p
G(p) + g(p) −
n − 1
(1 − p)ng(p)G(p).
The last summand is positive, so we only have to establish that [n−1]G(p) > −(1−p)g(p).
Using g(p) = −[G(p) − (1 − p)n−1]/p this will be the case if G(p) < (1 − p)n/[1 − np], which
is equivalent to 1 − np < (1 − p)n. This inequality holds by binomial expansion of (1 − p)n
and establishes the desired contradiction.
For the case x1 = x2 but w1 < w2, we have p1(w) < p2(w). Since h(.), H(.) and G(.) are all
strictly monotone, a similar argument as above establishes [h(p1(w))/H(p1(w))][∂p1(w)/∂w1] >
[h(p2(w))/H(p2(w))][∂p2(w)/∂w2], which yields the desired contradiction.
17In section 2 we discussed the diﬃculty of proving that higher productivity ﬁrms post
higher wages. Productive ﬁrms have an incentive to post high wages because they have a
high value from ﬁlling their vacancy, yet global market power yields a diﬀerent application
behavior to ﬁrms posting diﬀerent wages. If at low wages it is less desirable to increase the
wage, that could outweigh the higher incentives to post higher wages. Proposition 4.2 can be
interpreted as the proof that at the ﬁrst order condition the productivity eﬀect dominates a
market power eﬀect. In view of ﬁgure 1 it means that the distance between wages w1 and
w5 is larger than the distance of their best responses. That is, if ﬁrm 5 is at its optimum
and ﬁrm 1 is at least as productive as ﬁrm 5, then ﬁrm 1 best response is to the left of
w1. Therefore, in equilibrium wage oﬀers have to be indicative of the ranking of underlying
productivities by the ﬁrms.
4.2 Homogeneous Firms
The last result has immediate consequences for an environment with homogeneous ﬁrms: All
ﬁrms set the same wage in equilibrium. As we discussed in the introduction, the existence
of an equilibrium in which all ﬁrms post the same wage has been proven in BSW, yet the
existence of additional equilibria with wage dispersion had not been considered.15 One contri-
bution of the present work is the consideration of asymmetric posting strategies, i.e., even for
equal productivities ﬁrms’ equilibrium strategies are allowed to involve diﬀerent wage oﬀers.
Even in this case, despite the ﬁniteness of the market and the presence of search frictions,
any directed search equilibrium will only involve identical wage postings. Wage dispersion is
driven by fundamentals and is absent when ﬁrms are identical.
Corollary 4.1 If xj = xk for all j,k ∈ M, then in the unique directed search equilibrium all
ﬁrms set the same wage.
Proof. For equal productivities condition (C1) holds trivially, and therefore proposition 4.2
applies. BSW show that there exists only one directed search equilibrium in which all ﬁrms
post the same wage.
4.3 Lack of Constrained Eﬃciency
In directed search models the standard notion of eﬃciency is a notion of constrained eﬃciency.
This notion is based on the idea that the decentralized nature of the application process
cannot be overcome, i.e. workers will use symmetric strategies (see e.g. Montgomery (1991),
Shimer (2005)). Then the planners problem is to maximize output given the constrained that
15For the case of two workers and two ﬁrms, BSW consider the set of all equilibria.
18workers use a symmetric application behavior. Montgomery (1991) lays out the constrained








j=1 pj = 1 and pj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ M, where p = (p1,...,pn) is the vector of
application probabilities. This yields the following ﬁrst order conditions:
xjh(pj) ≤ λ, = λ if pj > 0, ∀j ∈ M, (17)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier for the problem. This holds only if the marginal output
gain from workers applying more is identical for all ﬁrms that receive applications with
positive probability, i.e. xjh(pj) is identical at all these ﬁrms. Montomery (1991) shows that
this condition holds under belief (2), i.e. when ﬁrms neglect their global market power. As
we discussed in section 2, the market power in a ﬁnite economy yields diﬀerent wages, and
therefore does not necessarily induce constrained eﬃciency. Montgomery (1991) mentions
this possibility without investigating it. While it is obvious that global market power aﬀects
wages, it is not clear that it aﬀects the application behavior of workers. It could be possible
that the change in wages is such that application behavior is not aﬀected and constrained
eﬃciency might still obtain. We show that this is the case indeed the case for homogeneous
ﬁrms. For heterogeneous ﬁrms this does not happen since ﬁrms post diﬀerent wages and
global market power aﬀects them diﬀerently. Proving this formally turns out to be diﬃcult
due to the implicit nature of the equation describing equilibrium behavior. We prove this
point for the case of a duopoly, i.e. m = 2, with arbitrary numbers of workers n ≥ 2, where
constrained eﬃciency is never achieved when ﬁrms are heterogeneous.
Proposition 4.3 If ﬁrms are homogeneous, the directed search equilibrium is constrained
eﬃcient. If (C1) holds in a duopoly market with heterogeneous ﬁrms, i.e. M = {1,2} and
x1 > x2, then the directed search equilibrium is ineﬃcient.
Proof. For homogeneous ﬁrms this is easy to see. By Corollary 4.1 all ﬁrms post identical
wages. Then all ﬁrms have equal hiring probability, and (17) holds trivially. It is straight-
forward to verify that this is suﬃcient for optimality.
Consider now the case of heterogeneous ﬁrms, under (C1) the equilibrium is characterized
by each ﬁrms ﬁrst order condition, i.e. by (23). In the appendix we show that (23) and opti-
mality condition (17) hold for the two ﬁrms only if either h(p1)w1 = h(p1)w1 or h(pj)xj/n =
19G(pj)wj for j ∈ {1,2}. The ﬁrst case cannot obtain because in equilibrium expected utilities
are equalized, i.e. G(p1)w1 = G(p2)w2, which implies G(p1)/h(p1) = G(p2)/h(p2), but cannot
arise because G(p)/h(p) is a strictly increasing function of p. Since x1 > x2 by assumption,
by Proposition 4.2 we have w1 > w2 in a directed search equilibrium, and therefore p1 > p2.
This contradicts G(p1)/h(p1) = G(p2)/h(p2) and condition (17) for optimality cannot be
fulﬁlled. The other condition also leads to a contradiction with the ﬁrms optimal behavior,
as we show in the appendix.
5 The Incomplete Information Environment
We now consider the environment in which productivities are private information. Each
ﬁrm j independently draws its productivity from a distribution Fj with non-zero density on
[x, ¯ x]. Let F denote the joint cumulative distribution function with support S. F is common
knowledge. Let F−j =
Q
k6=j Fk denote both the marginal and conditional distribution over
x−j given xj.
A pure strategy for ﬁrm j in this game of incomplete information is an element φj of the
space of functions Φj that map each type [xj, ¯ xj] into a wage in Wj = [0, ¯ xj]. A pure strategy
proﬁle is a tuple of functions φ = (φ1,...,φm) ∈ Φ = ×m
j=1Φj, and correspondingly a pure
strategy of the opponents is a tuple φ−j = (φ1,...,φj−1,φj+1,...,φm). The expected payoﬀs
of ﬁrm j are then given by
Πj(φ) = Exπj(φ(x)) =
Z
S
H(pj(φ(x)))[xj − φj(xj)]dF(x), (18)
where πj, pj and H are as deﬁned in the previous section and Ex denotes the expectations
operator with regard to x.
Deﬁnition 5.1 (DSEII) A directed search equilibrium with incomplete information (DSEII)
is a tuple φ ∈ Φ such that Πj(φ) ≥ Πj(φ0
j,φ−j) ∀j ∈ M,∀φ0
j ∈ Φj.
Our ﬁrst result is an analog to lemma 4.3. We want to show that we can restrict the
strategy space Φ to Φ ⊆ Φ involving only functions that map types into wages weakly above
. We want to show that an equilibrium in the restricted space is also an equilibrium in the
larger space.
Lemma 5.1 There exists 0 > 0 such that for all  ∈ [0,0] the following holds: For any
φ ∈ Φ every ﬁrm j has a best response in the unrestricted set Φj that maps all types into
wages in [, ¯ xj].
20Proof. In lemma 4.3 we showed that a wage wj ∈ [0,] does not get any applicants when
some other ﬁrms posts a wage larger than t, where t is independent of . If all other ﬁrms
oﬀer wage in [,t], the hiring probability for ﬁrm j is unity if it posts a wage larger than
z, where z is again independent of . This is strictly more proﬁtable at any productivity in
[xj, ¯ xj] than to oﬀer a wage in [0,] at which the hiring probability is less than a half – if 
is suﬃciently small. Therefore z weakly payoﬀ dominates any wage in [0,] for any wages
w−j ∈ [,∞)m−1 for  small.
From now on let  be such that the condition in lemma 4.3 is fulﬁlled, i.e.  ∈ (0,0) im-
plying wages in W = ×m
j=1[, ¯ xj]. A DSEII entails that for almost all types xj the announced
wage wj = φj(xj) maximizes the expected conditional payoﬀ Πj(wj,φ−j|xj), where
Πj(wj,φ−j|xj) = [xj − wj]
Z
H(pj(wj,φ−j(x−j)))dF−j(x−j). (19)
To develop existence arguments along the lines of Athey (2001) we next establish single
crossing. Note that under (C1) any type of ﬁrm can ensure itself strictly positive proﬁts.
That is, given any φ ∈ Φ there exists ˜ wj ∈ [0,xj) such that any higher wage ensures strictly
positive hiring probabilities, i.e. ˜ wj = sup{w ∈ [0,xj]|Ex−jH(pj(φ(xj,x−j))) = 0} < xj
exists.
Lemma 5.2 Given φ ∈ Φ, the function Πj(wj,φ−j|xj) satisﬁes the (Milgrom and Shannon,
1994) single crossing property in (wj,xj) ∈ [0, ¯ xj] × [xj, ¯ xj]. Under (C1) it satisﬁes strict
single crossing in (wj,xj) ∈ [˜ wj, ¯ xj] × [xj, ¯ xj].
Proof. Consider w0
j > wj and x0
j > xj. From (19) it trivially follows that Πj(w0
j,φ−j|xj) −
Πj(wj,φ−j|xj) ≥ (>)0 implies Πj(w0
j,φ−j|x0
j) − Πj(wj,φ−j|x0
j) ≥ (>)0. If wj ≥ ˜ wj then
Ex−jH(pj(w0






This yields immediately an existence result.
Proposition 5.1 A directed search equilibrium with incomplete information (DSEII) ex-
ists in non-decreasing strategies. Under (C1) any DSEII involves strategies that are non-
decreasing a.e.
Proof. For wage proﬁles in cube W the proﬁt function π(w) is continuous in w. Given
the single crossing property established in lemma 5.2, existence in non-decreasing strategies
in the restricted strategy space Φ follows immediately from Athey (2001) Theorem 1 and
21Theorem 2. By lemma 5.1 this equilibrium is also an equilibrium in the larger strategy space
Φ.
Any equilibrium strategy φj maximizes (19) almost everywhere. Under (C1) the range
of wages that maximize (19) is a subset of the wages for which we have established strict
single crossing in lemma 5.2. Therefore, every selection from the set of maximizing wages
(conditional on type) involves a selection that is monotone in the ﬁrm’s type (see Milgrom
and Shannon, 1994).
The proposition establishes that in equilibrium every ﬁrm increases its wage oﬀer in its
type. In general that does not imply that diﬀerent ﬁrms use equilibrium strategies that
imply that the ﬁrm with the higher realized productivity posts a weakly higher wage. This
would arise only if φj(x) = φk(x) for all x ∈ suppFj ∩ suppFk and all j,k ∈ M. If Fj 6= Fk
it is unlikely to be optimal for each ﬁrm to use the same strategy as the other, since the
distribution of realized wages that each ﬁrm faces will be diﬀerent.16 In the case where ﬁrms
are ex-ante identical, i.e. Fj = Fk for all j,k ∈ M we can establish the existence of equilibria
in symmetric strategies. In this case it is not only true that a ﬁrm’s wage is increasing in
its type, but also that the wage diﬀerential between ﬁrms yields information about the rank
order of their productivities. While it can be veriﬁed that Athey’s proof readily delivers
existence of symmetric equilibria, this is not formally stated and we provide a proof relying
on a recent ﬁxed point argument by Reny (2006) which is especially intuitive for Baysian
games.
Proposition 5.2 If ﬁrms are symmetric in the sense that Fj = Fk for all j,k ∈ M, there
exists a symmetric DSEII in non-decreasing strategies. Under (C1) any symmetric DSEII
involves strategies that are non-decreasing a.e..
Proof. Consider some symmetric strategy in Φ played by all ﬁrms, with ˆ φ denoting the
strategy for an individual ﬁrm. Due to the single crossing property, the best reply correspon-
dence of ﬁrm j to this strategy by the other players has a monotone selection (see Milgrom
and Shannon, 1994). Therefore we can restrict the set of best replies to a subset B(ˆ φ) of
the set of increasing functions in Φ without loss of optimality. This space of increasing
functions in Φ is compact under the L1-norm. Since Πj(φ) is continuous in φ ∈ Φ, by
Berge’s Theorem the best reply correspondence in increasing functions in Φ is non-empty
and upper-hemicontinuous.
To use a ﬁxed point argument, we need an additional condition such as convex-valuedness
of the best reply correspondence. While this can be established in our context, we will
16The intuition is the same as the intuition for diﬀerent bidding strategies in private value auctions in
which buyers have diﬀerent distributions for the valuations.
22rely on the concept of contractible-valuedness proposed in Reny (2006). The best response
correspondence B(ˆ φ) is contractible-valued if there is some φ1 ∈ B(ˆ φ) and a mapping h :
[0,1] × B(ˆ φ) → B(ˆ φ) such that h(0,φ0) = φ0 and h(1,φ0) = φ1 for all φ0 ∈ B(ˆ φ). This
simply means that we have to be able to map any best reply into some other best reply in
a continuous way without leaving the space of best reply functions. Reny (2006) proposes
the function h(t,φ0) = φ0
t for t ∈ [0,1] with the following property. For t ∈ [0,1/2] let
φ0
t(x) = φ0(x) for x ≤ xt = xj +(1/2−t)[¯ xj −xj] and φ0
t(x) = max{φ1(x),φ0(x)} for x > xt.
This function does nothing else then slowly move function φ0 onto φ1 whenever φ1 is higher.
It starts with high values of x, and the shift is continuous in the L1 integral norm. Clearly all
φ0
t are in B(ˆ φ) as they are still increasing, and for each type it either assigns φ1(x) or φ0(x)
which are both best replies a.e.. At the end of this part of the process, φ0
1/2 is the pointwise
maximum of φ1 and φ0. In the second part of the process involving t ∈ (1/2,1], this new
function φ0
1/2 is transformed into φ1 through the speciﬁcation φ0
t(x) = min{φ0
1/2(x),φ1(x)}
for x ≤ xt = xj + (1 − t)[¯ xj − xj] and φ0
t(x) = φ0
1/2(x) for x > xt. Again the transition is
continuous and preserves monotonicity and optimality. Clearly, h(1,φ0) = φ0
1 = φ1, and so
B(ˆ φ) is contraction-valued. Since the set of increasing functions in Φ is closed it is also an
absolute retract. Then B(.) has a ﬁxed point by Eilenberg and Montgomery’s (1946) ﬁxed
point theorem. (See Reny (2006) Theorem 5.1.)
By lemma 5.1 the ﬁxed point is a symmetric DSEII in the unrestricted space Φ. The
reason why any symmetric DSEII involves non-decreasing strategies under (C1) is the same
as in lemma 5.1.
Finally, we brieﬂy establish that the ineﬃciency results from the complete information
environment carry over to this environment with incomplete information. Constrained eﬃ-
ciency would be obtained if a social planner that assigns a behavioral strategy to each ﬁrm
and a symmetric strategy to the workers cannot achieve more matches than the decentral-
ized equilibrium. Consider the case of a duopoly of ﬁrms, i.e. m = 2 and arbitrary n ≥ 2.
Let F ∞ denote a joint distribution of types for the complete information environment, i.e.
F ∞
j (x) = 0 for x < xj and F ∞
j (x) = 1 otherwise for some productivity xj of ﬁrm j. Assume
x1 6= x2. Now consider a sequence of joint distributions {F k}∞
k=1 of our incomplete informa-
tion environment that converges weakly to F ∞. We will show that the equilibrium outcomes
of this game of incomplete information are not constrained eﬃcient.17
Proposition 5.3 Assume all F k have identical support and C1 holds. Then, there exists k∗
such that for all k > k∗ the set of directed search equilibria associated for distribution F k are
17The proof is a bit more elaborate than the standard puriﬁcation result by Harsanyi (1973) since we have
continuous type and strategy spaces.
23not constrained eﬃcient.
Proof. For the limit distribution F ∞ all directed search equilibria are ineﬃcient. For pure
posting strategies we know this from Proposition 4.3. Even if ﬁrms would use non-degenerate
mixed strategies the equilibrium would be ineﬃcient as (17) would be violated with strictly
positive probability. If the set of equilibria of the incomplete information game is upper-
hemicontinuous in the type distribution, then the equilibria of the incomplete information
game converge to the equilibria of the complete information game, and the ineﬃciency carries
over.
The appropriate notion of upper-hemicontinuity is established in Theorem 2 of Milgrom
and Weber (1986). Our environment fulﬁlls their requirement of absolute continuous infor-
mation because of the independence of the productivity draws. If we restrict the strategy
space to Φ, i.e. allow only wage postings above some  > 0, our environment fulﬁlls also the
equicontinuous payoﬀ condition, and we have upper-hemicontinuity under this restriction.
Finally, note that the restriction does not reduce the set of equilibria given condition C1.
Under C1, even the lowest type ﬁrm can make strictly positive equilibrium proﬁts. Therefore,
every type of ﬁrm has to have strictly positive probability of hiring at any wage that it oﬀers.
We know from the argument establishing lemma 5.1 that we can ﬁnd constants t and z such
that: If ﬁrm 1 oﬀers a wage below , it has a positive hiring probability only when ﬁrm 2
posts a wage below t. Moreover, if ﬁrm 2 posts a wage below t, ﬁrm 1 can be sure to hire
a worker by oﬀering a wage of z. Let w1 be the lowest wage ﬁrm 1 posts in equilibrium,
i.e. w1 = inf{w|
R
x:φ1(x)≥w dF1(x) < 1}. Deﬁne a similar lowest wage for ﬁrm 2. We want
to show that each ﬁrm oﬀers only wages above  for  small. Assume to the contrary that
w1 < . Oﬀering a wage (close to) w1 yields a strictly positive hiring probability for ﬁrm 1
only when ﬁrm 2 posts a wage below t. But in this case the hiring probability for ﬁrm 1 has
to be above the average of H(1/2) (it has to be close to 1 in fact), as otherwise it would be
strictly better to oﬀer z since the cost of increasing the wage is at most z (and thus small
compared to the gain in hiring probability). Therefore, ﬁrm 2 has to oﬀer wages below w1
at least some of the time, i.e. w2 < w1. Repeating the analysis from the view of ﬁrm 2, it
has to hold that w1 < w2. This means that ﬁrms are only willing to oﬀer very low wages if
they outbid their competitor, which cannot be mutually compatible and yields the desired
contradiction. Our restriction is therefore not binding.
6 Conclusions
In ﬁnite markets individual participants have market power. This might be important in a
labor market that is segregated by profession, geographical location and time of hiring. We
24show that equilibria in pure posting strategies exist in a ﬁnite directed search economy. This
result holds both in the case when ﬁrms know each other’s productivity levels, and in the case
when they only know the distribution from which their competitors draw their productivities.
We also prove that, despite the ﬁnite frictional nature of our environment, wage diﬀerences are
driven by productivity diﬀerences when ﬁrms have complete information and when they have
incomplete information drawn from a symmetric distribution. This conﬁrms the results of
models where there is no global market power, either because the market is large (Shi (2001),
Shimer (2005)) or by assumption (Montgomery (1991)). Furthermore, wage dispersion is
absent when ﬁrms are identical. The last point expands on the results of Burdett, Shi and
Wright (2001) who take global market power into account in a model with homogeneous ﬁrms
but focus on equilibria where all ﬁrms oﬀer the same wage. Our paper clariﬁes that in their
environment there are no other equilibria in pure posting strategies. For homogeneous ﬁrms,
wages are reduced compared to the case without global market power, yet all ﬁrms are equally
prone to this reduction and constrained eﬃcient application behavior is obtained. In markets
with heterogeneous ﬁrms wage dispersion is present and diﬀerent wages are diﬀerently aﬀected
by global market power. We prove this for a duopoly case, in which heterogeneity always
prevents an eﬃcient application behavior.
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4.2:
The set Aj = {wj ∈ (wj,xj) | (wj,w−j) / ∈ Ωj} contains only a ﬁnite number of ele-
ments. By continuity of pj(.), uj(.) and G(.) the second equality in (9) readily implies
limwj% ˆ wj ∂pj(wj,w−j)/∂wj < limwj& ˆ wj ∂pj(wj,w−j)/∂wj for all ˆ wj ∈ Aj.
Therefore, it will be suﬃcient to show strict concavity for all wj ∈ (wj,xj)\Aj. Denoting



























where we omitted the argument w for brevity. We will show that (20) is strictly negative.
We will split the round bracket into three parts A, B and C and show that each is non-
negative. Moreover, A = g(pj)[∂pj/∂wj]Xj is strictly positive because g(pj) and Xj are
strictly negative.













Rearrangements and the use of (9) yields
B = G(pj)wj[2g(pj)
2 − g
0(pj)G(pj)] + Xj g(pj)G(pj).
Since the last summand is positive, B is positive if the square bracket is positive. Let
T(p) = 2g(p)2−g0(p)G(p) reﬂect this bracket. Noting that g0(p) = 1
np3{2−2(1−p)n−2np(1−
p)n−1 −n(n−1)p2(1−p)n−2}, inserting and rearranging yields T(p) = D(p)/[np3(1−p)n−2],
with the numerator D(p) = −2(1 − p) + (n − 1)p + 2(1 − p)n+1 + (n + 1)p(1 − p)n. Since
the denominator is positive, we have to show that the numerator is positive. Note that
D(0) = 0. D0(p) = n + 1 − (n + 1)(1 − p)n − (n + 1)np(1 − p)n−1 and thus D0(0) = 0. Then
D00(p) = (n + 1)n(n − 1)p(1 − p)n−2 > 0 proves that B ≥ 0.














and clearly ∂pk/∂wj ≤ 0 we have shown that C is non-negative if g0(pk) ≥ 0. Application of
L’Hopital’s rule yields g0(0) = (n−1)(n−2)/3 ≥ 0. Since g00(p) = n(n−1)(n−2)p2(1−p)n−3 ≥
0 we have g0(p) ≥ 0 for all p ≥ 0.
Remaining Proof of Proposition 4.3:
We have to show that for heterogeneous ﬁrms the ﬁrst order condition (23) and the
optimality condition (17) imply h(p1)w1 = h(p2)w2. We can use the fact that in a directed











(x2 − w2). (23)




(x1 − w1) = h(p2)
|g(p1)|w1
np2
(x2 − w2), (24)
where we have suppressed the dependence of pj on w and used the relation G(pj) = H(pj)/(npj).
26Substituting |g(pj)| = [G(pj) − h(pj)/n]/pj and rearranging yields
h(p1)(x1 − w1)[G(p2)w2 − h(p2)w2/n] = h(p2)(x2 − w2)[G(p1)w1 − h(p1)w1/n]. (25)
In equilibrium workers apply as to equalize expected utility, i.e. G(p1)w1 = G(p2)w2 = Ca is
constant. Optimality requires h(p1)x1 = h(p2)x2 = Cb to be constant. We therefore have
[−Ca + Cb/n][h(p1)w1 − h(p2)w2] = 0. (26)
This implies that either Ca = G(p1)w1 = G(p2)w2 = h(p1)x1/n = h(p2)x2/n = Cb/n or
h(p1)w1 = h(p2)w2.
If h(p1)w1 = h(p2)w2, then we can use G(p1)w1 = G(p2)w2 to obtain G(p1)/h(p1) =





n2((1 − p)n−1p)2[−1 + (1 − p)
n−1p + (1 − p)
n + (n − 1)(1 − p)
−1p] (27)
The term in square brackets is zero at p = 0 and has a derivative (n − 1)[1 − (1 − p)n]/(1 −
p)2 > 0, therefore G(p)/h(p) is strictly increasing, and since p1 > p2 in equilibrium we have
h(p1)w1 6= h(p2)w2.
If G(pj)wj = h(pj)xj/n for j ∈ {1,2}, we get a contradiction to the ﬁrst order condition
of the ﬁrms combined with optimality. Using this relationship to substitute out w1 from (9)








The second term in the denominator can be written as |g(p1)|p1/G(p1). Moreover, [∂p1/∂w1] =



















where we used the fact that H(p1)/[np1] = G(p1) to obtain the last factor. Similarly, we








Yet p1 > p2 implies G(p1) < G(p2), and therefore h(p1)x1 < h(p2)x2, which violates the
optimality condition (17).
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